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ARGUMENT 
To Address the arguments made by Defendants, this Court is called upon to first 
determine whether shareholder agreements which are inconsistent with one or more of 
the provisions of the former Utah Business Corporation Act or the current Utah Revised 
Business Corporation Act are for that reason, necessarily void as against public policy. 
Defendants ask the Court to concern itself with corporate inconvenience alleging 
that the terms of the agreements make management decisions more difficult and remove 
from directors their absolute and unequivocal management authority. The same concerns 
could be raised if the shareholder agreements were written. Section 16-10a-732(l) is 
broad and does not specify any limitation on the scope of that to which shareholders may 
agree. Defendants must necessarily agree that Section 732 specifically authorizes 
shareholder agreements having the same focus, purpose and terms as alleged by 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and admitted for the purpose of this appeal. Therefore, Defendants 
must further agree that the scope and terms of the agreements are fully authorized by 
statute. If these agreements had been written and contained a written declaration that 
they were to extend for a term in excess often years, they would have complied precisely 
as the Defendants urge the Court to now require. 
This Court has never determined that shareholder agreements, written or verbal, 
are contrary to public policy. Therefore, unless now invalidated by public policy 
concerns or by Section 732, the Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler shareholder agreements are 
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valid and their scope and purpose is specifically acknowledged and approved if not 
empowered by subsection 732(1). 
A. THIS COURT HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT SHAREHOLDER 
AGREEMENTS INCONSISTENT WITH THE BUSINESS CORPORTION 
ACT ARE FOR THAT REASON, INVALID UNDER UTAH LAW, 
SECTION 732 DOES NOT VOID SUCH AGREEMENTS 
Defendants, Ostler International and Ostler Property Development at all times 
were closely held corporations. They were owned only by Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler. 
Pursuant to their verbal agreements, all policies and practices for the operation of 
companies, including the conduct of the business of each company, was formulated and 
implemented only and solely by Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler and with consent of the 
other. [R. 4, U 21]. Their agreement was one of mutual consent and persuasion. In other 
words, they agreed to operate the companies and cause them to be managed relying on 
that mutual consent. 
There is no claim that the board of directors did not function or that the hiring and 
retention of company management and employees was not undertaken pursuant to the 
determination and direction of the board of directors. The two brothers worked together 
pursuant to their agreement, to cause and assure that their business practices were 
adopted and implemented by management. In other words, their agreement was to 
influence if not direct decisions by the directors. Such was not unexpected, but necessary 
where there were only two shareholders each owning an identical 50% of the shares. 
There is nothing about these shareholder agreements or the circumstance of the 
shareholder parties which would recommend let alone compel a determination that the 
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agreements as a matter of law were invalid under traditional legal principals. 
Notwithstanding, Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler claim that such principals invalidate the 
agreements. Brief of Appellees Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler at 15. They give no Utah 
precedent for their premise. Once again, the Official Commentary to Utah Revised 
Business Corporation Act as adopted by the Utah Legislature acknowledges that modem 
decisions reflect a greater willingness to uphold shareholder agreements. Official 
Commentary, p. 338. Although this Court has not previously addressed the issue, other 
jurisdictions have sustained shareholder agreements inconsistent with the applicable 
business corporation act and even where the agreement declared the manner in which 
corporate earnings were to be allocated among shareholders, established a veto over a 
proposed corporation action or established policy for the corporation to follow in 
conducting its business. See Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Validity of 
Stockholders' Agreement Allegedly Infringing on Directors' Management Powers - -
Modem Cases, 15 ALR 4th 1078, §§ 2[a], 4-6 (2005). 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732 is the first and only Utah statute addressing 
shareholder agreements as such. There has never been a statutory prohibition of such 
agreements. Obviously, whether a particular shareholder agreement was enforceable 
historically depended upon then traditional legal principals. The trial court ruling 
construes Section 732 to be a Statute of Frauds. Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler correctly 
recognize that it is not. Brief of Appellees, Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler at 17. They say 
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that it only authorizes a contractual deviation from the statutory scheme. However, there 
neither is nor has been a statutory scheme for shareholder agreements. 
1. SECTION 732 IS AMBIGUOUS. 
Section 732(b) uses the term "shall" in addressing the conditions therein 
enumerated. Defendants correctly recognize that such term is usually presumed to be 
mandatory. However, the Section does not state that agreements not in compliance with 
the enumerated conditions are for that reason void. It therefore is ambiguous and we look 
to the Official Commentary declaring that such agreements are not invalidated by that 
failure to comply. 
Defendants cite to certain instances in which this Court has previously ruled with 
regard to its interpretation of statutes. In none of those cases had the Utah Legislature 
endorsed and directed the publication of an official commentary as an aid in the 
understanding and interpretation of the statute. In the instant case, however, the 
Legislature has done so evidencing its intention that its insight if not direction should be 
considered with regard to the understanding and interpretation of Section 732. The 
Official Commentary specifically declares that there should not be "a negative inference 
that an agreement of a type that is or might be embraced by one of the categories of 
section 732(1) is, ipso facto, a type of agreement that is not valid unless it complies with 
section 732". Official Commentary at 338. The Commentary further declares that 
"[s]ection 732 minimizes the formal requirements for a shareholder agreement" and 
"[t]he principal requirements are simply that the agreement be in writing and be approved 
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or agreed to by all persons who are then shareholders". Id. at 339. Consequently, if 
parties to a particular shareholder agreement seek Section 732 validation of the 
agreement, then that validation is dependent upon compliance with Subsection 732(2). 
However, if traditional legal principals will otherwise support the enforceability of the 
agreement, then enforceability is not dependent upon the Section. 
This Court, in Foutz v. City of South Jordan, 2004 UT 75, 100 P.3d 1171 
reiterated its ruling in State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 4 P.3d 795 as to the purpose it seeks to 
achieve in statutory construction. The Court said: 
Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, 
as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve. 
Id. at Tf 11 (Emphasis added). 
Section 732 clearly provides that agreements compliant with subsection (2) are 
authorized by the Section. However, it does not declare what is to be the effect on 
agreements long in existence, and partially performed by and with significant economic 
impact to the parties. Consequently, there is raised the question of what purpose the 
Legislature intended to accomplish with Section 732. The answer is given in the Official 
Commentary recognizing the long existence of shareholder agreements relating to closely 
held corporations and the need to provide recognition and enforceability to those 
agreements. It is not declared that Section 732 is to bring immediate termination and 
invalidity to agreements in existence at the date of the enactment of the statute and 
irrespective of their duration, past performance and the economic impact to the parties. 
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The inescapable legislative intent is to permit agreements falling within the framework*of 
Subsection 732(2) to find automatic validation under the Section, but to permit other 
shareholder agreements to be tested against traditional legal principals. 
Ostler International and Ostler Property Development correctly acknowledge that 
Section 732 does not specify a part performance exception. Brief of Appellees Ostler 
International and Ostler Property Development at 17. Of course, there also is no specific 
declaration that verbal agreements, by virtue of that fact, are void. Absent that 
declaration of invalidity, there is not a need to specifically provide a part performance 
exception. The Official Commentary sufficiently answers the questions as to why part 
performance is not specifically addressed in the Section. 
According to the Official Commentary, Section 732 was enacted in response to a 
recognition, if not finding, that agreements among shareholders of closely held 
corporations are commonplace and that there is justification for their recognition and 
enforcement. It was enacted at a time when such agreements were finding approval by 
the modern line of cases. The Official Commentary declares that Section 732 "is 
intended to add, within the context of the traditional corporate structure, legal certainty to 
shareholder agreements that embody various aspects of the business arrangement 
established by the shareholders to meet their business and personal needs . . . . Thus, 
Section 732 validates for nonpublic corporations various types of agreements among 
shareholders even when the agreements are inconsistent with the statutory norms 
contained in the Model Act and Revised Act". Official Commentary, p. 338. (Internal 
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citation omitted), (emphasis added). In other words, the Section seeks to add legal 
certainty to such agreements. 
2. UTAH LAW SHOULD ASSUME SHAREHOLDER 
AGREEMENTS TO BE VALID. 
There is no Utah precedent for the premise that an agreement between 
shareholders, inconsistent with a provision of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act 
or of the former Utah Business Corporation Act, is based upon that fact alone, invalid and 
unenforceable. There is no Utah precedent for the premise that such agreements violate 
public policy. Consequently, such agreements are presumed enforceable unless and until 
otherwise determined. See Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ^ 15, 
8 P.3d256. 
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler argue that there cannot be a valid shareholder 
agreement without specific statutory authorization. See Brief of Appellees Dale Ostler 
and Vyron Ostler at 15. However, Section 732 does not create a first and original right in 
shareholders to contract one with another, but rather recognizes that such agreements 
regarding closely held corporations have long existed and that there is a need to facilitate 
their enforcement. 
Arguing that there is no such right absent strict compliance with Section 732(2), 
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler refer to the formalities imposed by statute regarding the 
execution of a decedent's last will and testament. Such is not a relevant analogy. The 
Official Commentary recognizes the previous existence of agreements between 
shareholders of closely held corporations. It neither finds nor declares that such 
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agreements were or should have been invalid. In other words, there is neither an 
aclmowledgement nor a declaration that such agreements are necessarily dependent upon 
statutory authorization. Conversely, in order for a decedent's will to be valid, it must 
comply with statutory requirements. A will is a unilateral declaration of the testator's 
intentions regarding heirship and the management of the probate estate. It has no 
efficacy until the testator's death. The testator thereafter has no ability to enforce the will 
or to compel performance by his heirs of the matters on which he has conditioned their 
receipt of the testate property. 
The subject shareholder agreements are however, bilateral, providing rights and 
imposing conditions of performance on the respective parties to the agreements. 
Therefore and unless invalidated by Section 732, the agreements arose independent of 
statute. They were mutually and reciprocally performed over a number of years with each 
party expecting and receiving the benefit of the performance of the other party. Because 
a decedent's will is a creature of statute and cannot exist in the absence of statutory 
empowerment, the statute dictates the conditions of that empowerment and does not 
declare as void an instrument which fails to comply. On the other hand, as declared by 
the Official Commentary, the purpose of Section 732 "is intended to add,. . . legal 
certainty to shareholder agreements that embody various aspects of the business 
arrangement established by the shareholders to meet their business and personal needs." 
Official Commentary, p. 338. If the agreements are written and additionally, if they 
intend to continue for a term in excess of 10 years, and specifically therein so declare, 
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then the agreements are thereby self proved by Section 732. However, if not so self 
proved, then their validation and enforceability is dependent upon the application of 
traditional legal principals. 
B. CORPORATE CONVENIENCE IS NOT AN ISSUE TO BE HERE 
DETERMINED 
Defendants argue as though they are attempting to contend against the 
enforcement of oral agreements in general. Of course, such agreements are valid. "The 
lack of a written agreement does not mean that there was no enforceable agreement." 
Distort v. Enviropak Medical Products, Inc., 893 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995). 
Defendants declare that the enforcement of the Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler shareholder 
agreements will complicate management of these companies. Brief of Appellees Dale 
Ostler and Vyron Ostler at 12; Brief of Appellees Ostler International and Ostler Property 
Development at 26. However, the agreements, if written and in compliance with 
subsection 732(2) would certainly have been enforceable. Defendants make no attempt 
to identify any inconvenience, difficulty or burden with which the companies have dealt 
in the past as a consequence of Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler operating under the verbal 
shareholder agreements. Defendants do not tell us why and how any such complications 
or inconvenience would have been avoided if the agreements had been written and 
thereby validated by Section 732. 
Obviously, the mutual rights and obligations to which Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler 
agreed could have been reduced to writing without any limitation on their enforcement. 
However the trial court held that the agreements were invalid, not because of some claim 
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that they complicated management of the companies, but rather because they were verbal. 
Had Gary Ostler's rights and obligations arisen under written agreement, the companies 
and their management, would have been required to deal and respond in the same manner 
as they now must do. 
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler propose that this Court's decision should be based in 
part on considerations of convenience to the companies. Brief of Appellees Dale Ostler 
and Vyron Ostler at 37-41. No where, however, can they show that such considerations 
motivated the enactment of Section 732. They contend that there are policy objectives 
that are best served by the agreement of shareholders being reduced to writing. Again, 
they neither show nor contend that such considerations were entertained by the Utah 
Legislature with regard to its enactment of Section 732. Admittedly, it is easier to 
determine the specific terms of an agreement if the same are written. Notwithstanding, 
neither Section 732 nor the issues framed in this appeal are directed at corporate 
convenience. 
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler further argue that shareholders, by their agreement, 
might attempt to cause a corporation to override conditions imposed by law. Brief of 
Appellees Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler at 41. However, such ignores that such could be 
the case irrespective of whether the shareholder agreements were written or verbal. 
Section 732 declares that there are and can be shareholder agreements. The law 
presumes agreements are intended to and will comply with the law, whether the 
agreements be verbal or written. Although for any number of reasons a written as 
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opposed to a verbal agreement is preferred irrespective of the agreements scope or 
purpose, such is not here the issue. Rather, the questions are whether the Gary Ostler and 
Dale Ostler verbal shareholder agreements were valid absent Section 732 and if so, 
whether they are now invalidated by the Section. 
C. IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT SECTION 732 HAS APPLICATION WITH 
REGARD TO ALL SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS EXISTING AT AND 
AFTER ENACTMENTOF THE SECTION 
The shareholder agreement regarding Ostler International was in place, operative 
and being performed by Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler for years prior to the enactment of 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732. Notwithstanding, upon enactment of the statute, the 
agreement became subject thereto. Mr. Stowell does not suggest otherwise. However, 
prior to Section 732, the agreement was valid and enforceable under Utah law and 
remains so. 
D. THE MAINE AND CONNECTICUT COURT DECISIONS CITED BY 
DEFENDANTS ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE 
Defendants cite to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Villar v. Kernan, 695 
A.2d 1221 (Me. 1997). Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler further cite to the Appellate Court 
of Connecticut in Fairfax Properties, Inc. v. Lyons, 806 A.2d 535 (Conn. Ct. App. 2002). 
The cases, although perhaps of interest with regard to the issues before this Court are 
clearly distinguishable. 
In Villar v. Kernan the Court addressed a section of the Maine Business 
Corporation Act 13-A M.R.S.A. § 618, and ruled that the same prohibited the 
enforcement of verbal shareholder agreements relating to the affairs of a corporation. 
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The statute, although not the equivalent of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732 is materially 
similar. It read in relevant part: 
1. No written agreement, whether contained in the articles of incorporation or 
bylaws or in a written side agreement, and which relates to any phase of the 
affairs of the corporation,.... 
g . . . . shall be deemed invalid because the agreement contains any such provision, 
or because it limits or restricts the powers of discretion of the directors of 
the corporation,..., if the following conditions are satisfied: 
A. . . . the agreement has been expressly assented to in writing by all 
shareholders of the corporation, whether or not entitled to vote; and 
B. Subsequent to the making of the agreement or its adoption in the articles 
or bylaws, shares are transferred or issued only to persons who have 
notice or actual knowledge thereof, or assent in writing thereto. 
2. Notwithstanding a failure to satisfy the conditions set out in subsection 1, 
paragraphs A and B, such an agreement shall be valid and enforceable 
between the parties thereto, and their assignees and successors who have 
notice thereof unless it is affirmatively shown that its enforcement would be 
prejudicial to the rights of third parties who intervene in objection to its 
enforcement. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Maine Court determined: 
Although subsection (2) reflects an intent to allow enforcement of 
shareholder agreements despite their failure to comply with the formalities 
of subsection (1), the language of the subsection does not excuse the 
writing requirements specified in the first sentence of that subsection. 
Thus, only written agreements that fail to meet the requirements of 
subsection (1) may be enforceable among the parties to the agreement by 
virtue of subsection (2). 
Villar, 695 A.2d at 1224. The Court observed by way of footnote that "[sjection 618 was 
enacted at a time when shareholder agreements were viewed by courts as unenforceable 
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infringements on traditional corporate structure and control." Id. at 1224. It appears the 
court, despite the specific language of subsection (2), determined that the intention of the 
legislature at the time of the enactment of the statute, years earlier, was that shareholder 
agreements were to be unenforceable unless written. 
It was in 1992 that Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732 was enacted. Then modern 
case law authority was oftentimes validating and enforcing shareholder agreements. 
Additionally, the Utah Legislature endorsed and directed the publication of the Official 
Commentary. The Villar decision says nothing about any legislative commentary 
endorsed and published as an aide in the understanding and interpretation of Section 618. 
The Court, however, at footnote 3 of its decision, specifically contrasted its decision with 
what is found in the Official Commentary to Section 732 that "the enumeration of these 
types of agreements is not exclusive; nor should it give rise to a negative inference that an 
agreement of a type that is or might be embraced by one of the categories . . . is ipso 
facto, a type of agreement that is not valid unless it complies with [that] section. . . ." 
Villar, 695 A.2d at 1224. The Villar Court, it appears, thereby suggests that if Section 
732 was the statute which it was then called upon to interpret, and if the Official 
Commentary to the section had been endorsed by the Maine Legislature, it may well have 
determined the verbal shareholder agreement subject of its concern to have been valid 
and enforceable. 
In Fairfax Properties, Inc. v. Lyons, 806 A.2d 535 the Appellate Court of 
Connecticut dealt with rather convoluted tactical procedures implemented by the parties 
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in requesting the court to interpret and determine rights among corporate shareholders 
arising under their written agreement and under a written corporate resolution 
incorporating the terms of the agreement. Determining that both the agreement and the 
resolution were valid, the court cited to Connecticut General Statutes § 33-717. The 
Statute is not identical to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732(2) but is materially similar. 
However, the court did not declare that the subject agreements being written rather than 
verbal was material to its decision. The question was never raised. The court did not 
declare that the agreement and the resolution would have been invalid if not written. The 
court did not refer to any legislative commentary nor declare whether such existed. The 
court's decision is not relevant to the issues before this Court nor helpful to its ultimate 
decision. 
E. THE SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS DID NOT EXPIRE AS A 
CONSEQUENCE OF THE TIME LIMITATION PROVIDED IN 
SUBSECTION 732(2) 
Once again, those shareholder agreements for which the parties seek validation 
under Section 732, rather than upon traditional legal principals, must comply with all of 
the requirements of Subsection 732(2). One such requirement is that the agreement is 
limited to a term of only ten years, unless it provides otherwise. Utah Code Ann. § 16-
10a-732(2). 
Mr. Stowell's Complaint does not allege a specific term for these shareholder 
agreements. The agreements were to assure Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler that their 
respective shares and ownership interests in the two companies would enjoy the 
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protection of being held and enjoyed with a requirement of mutual agreement regarding 
the business policies and decisions which would determine the value of that ownership. 
Obviously, it was their intention and design to preserve and protect that value for as long 
as that ownership interest was held by they and the objects of their bounty. The 
agreements would come to an end upon the termination and winding up of the 
companies. Prior to that time, those who hold that ownership interest are entitled to the 
rights and protection which Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler intended and to which they 
agreed. 
Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler were inarguably mortal with no assurance as to 
whether either or both would survive the completion of their business enterprise. This 
Court may take judicial notice of their individual expectation that this and other interests 
owned at their death would pass to their designated heirs. 
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler cite to Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d . 
852 (Utah 1998) wherein this court addressed a written agreement providing for an 
option to purchase certain real property. The trial court had held the agreement was 
unenforceable in part because it violated the common law rule against perpetuities.1 This 
Court, in holding that the rule against perpetuities did not void the agreement, said: 
In an attempt to give effect to the intent of the parties, the settled rule is that if a 
contract fails to specify a time of performance the law implies that it shall be done 
within a reasonable time under the circumstances. . . . An implied reasonable time 
limit is as much a part of the agreement as those terms that are expressed. 
Coulter & Smith, Ltd., 966 P.2d at 858. (Internal citations omitted) 
1
 Utah Code Ann. Section 75-2-1208, effective July 1, 1998, provides that the common law rule against 
perpetuities does not apply in Utah. 
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Ostler International and Ostler Property Development argue that contracts that do 
not specify a duration are generally presumed to be terminable at will. Brief of Appellees 
Ostler International and Ostler Property Development at 22. Attempting to support that 
premise, they cite Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92, f 21, 54 P.3d 
1165. The case is not on point. There, this Court was interpreting an employment 
agreement and was focusing on its determination that the agreement was an at-will 
agreement. Specifically, this Court said "courts in Utah and elsewhere adopted the at-
will employment rule, under which employment contracts that did not specify a duration 
were generally presumed to be terminable at will." Id. at f^ 21. These shareholder 
agreements are not employment contracts. There is no allegation and therefore, no 
factual admission that the parties had agreed that those agreements were to terminate at 
the will of either party. 
Considering the purposes of their agreements, Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler 
necessarily intended and agreed that the shareholder agreements would remain in place 
for so long as their shares in the companies were owned by them and by the objects of 
their bounty. Perhaps we should ask whether Dale Ostler's opposition to the enforcement 
of the shareholder agreements would have been raised by his probate estate and heirs in 
the event that he had predeceased his brother. 
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F. THE SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS ARE NOT PERSONAL SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler seek to show that the shareholder agreements are 
personal services contracts and that Gary Ostler's rights thereunder are not transferable to 
his personal representative and the heirs of his probate estate. Mr. Stowell's Complaint 
does not allege that Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler agreed to provide any particular service 
or management skill or for that matter to undertake responsibility for any particular 
performance with regard to the companies. Consequently, the admitted fact is that they 
did not so agree. The 50% interest which each held in the companies imposed a joint 
right to be persuaded by the other with regard to the general business practices and 
purposes of the companies. 
Ostler International and Ostler Property Development seek to construe these 
shareholder agreements as though they were agreements between general partners. Brief 
of Appellees Ostler International and Ostler Property Development at 25-26. However, 
Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler were not partners. They were the sole shareholders of these 
companies. Their shareholder agreements were directed at their shares of capital stock. 
The terms of their agreements fall within the contemplation and parameters of Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-10a-732(l). If the agreements had been written they would have been 
validated by the Section. The agreements most certainly are not governed by partnership 
law. 
The shareholder agreements did not require either Gary or Dale Ostler to be 
personally involved in the day to day management of the companies, but rather to 
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mutually determine and to agree upon those who would undertake and perform that 
management. Mr. Stowell is the Personal Representative of the Gary Ostler probate 
estate. He neither claims nor is required to have any particular expertise with regard to 
the management or business of the companies. He has a contractual right to be informed 
sufficient to make an informed decision to either consent to or oppose a particular 
business or management practice. He has the right to be persuaded. He has the right to 
object or consent. 
It should be noted that upon Dale Ostler's death, his rights under the agreements 
necessarily will be exercised by his designated personal representative or trustee and 
eventually, the heirs of his probate estate or beneficiaries of any trust. Such 
representative, heirs and beneficiaries will not be expected to possess or to provide any 
particular expertise or experience relative to the business of the companies. 
Notwithstanding, if the probate of the Gary Ostler estate is then ongoing, Mr. Stowell and 
the heirs of the Gary Ostler estate and the personal representative or trustee and heirs or 
beneficiaries of Dale Ostler will then be called upon to recognize and utilize the same 
reciprocal rights of consent and persuasion regarding the business and operation of the 
companies. 
CONCLUSION 
The Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler shareholder agreements, although inconsistent 
with a portion of the Utah Business Corporation Act and now the Utah Revised Business 
Corporation Act, neither were nor now are invalidated, by reasons of that inconsistency. 
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They have been partially performed by Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler and are valid and 
enforceable based upon traditional legal principals. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732 
recognizes the existence of such agreements and does not invalidate them. Whether 
shareholder agreements and particularly those which are not written constitute an 
inconvenience to the corporate management is not an issue before the Court. These 
shareholder agreements did not expire as a consequence of the time limitation provided in 
Subsection 732(2) and neither were nor are personal service contracts. As a 
consequence, Gary Ostler's rights and obligations under these shareholder agreements are 
now held by Douglas L. Stowell as Personal Representative of his probate estate. 
DATED this jf? day of December, 2005. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
A. W^ton' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Dougras L. Stowell, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
Gary W. Ostler, Deceased 
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